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Molly J. Walker Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The goals of environmental regulation were first spelled out in the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), inaugurated by
President Richard Nixon on January 1, 1970. This initial piece of
environmental legislation described "the continuing policy of the
Federal Government ... to use all practicable means and measures..
.to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans."'
Since the inception of the NEPA more than two decades ago, more
specific environmental goals have been set and legislated, giving rise
to the command-and-control system of environmental regulation that
exists today. Following the NEPA, Congress instituted the Clean
Air Act ("CAA"), the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA"). Despite literally thousands of pages of regulation,
critics have questioned the effectiveness and efficiency of the
provisions specified under these acts.
2
Much of the criticism stems from the failure of the environmental
regulatory system to attain many of the goals specified at the outset.
For instance, in 1994, nine years after water quality standards were
set under the CWA, 40% of evaluated waters were not in
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2005).
2. See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning
of Environmental Command-and-control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191,
193 (2001). See also Sidney Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and
Throwing Out the Bathwater: Justice Breyer's Critique of
Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 727 (1995); William F.
Pedersen, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
1059, 1059 (1981).
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compliance. 3 The CAA has suffered similar delays and setbacks,
resulting in more than 60 million people living in areas that had not
attained pollutant levels low enough to meet the state standards as
late as 1999.
4
A New York assistant attorney general wrote: "decades of
experience have illustrated that traditional 'command and control'
enforcement/punishment mechanisms have been unable to fully
achieve the lofty goals of the major environmental statutes.",5 Critics
of the current system of environmental regulation have advanced a
number of theories for why the system has failed to meet
expectations. Behavioral theory, however, has been noticeably
absent in efforts to explain failures in the system. Specifically, those
advocating environmental law reform have ignored the influence of
cognitive biases on the behavior of those targeted by environmental
regulation.
This paper will argue that the structure of the current command-
and-control system of environmental regulation maximizes the
conflict between regulators and industry, resulting in polarization
and devaluation of legitimate solutions by wary industry leaders. It
will further assert that these biases affect the behavior of potential
polluters in real and substantial ways, and that they are therefore
significant obstacles to the goals of the system. Finally, it will
explain why creating a market system is not the answer, and it will
provide several suggestions to improve the design of the system,
citing Project XL as a promising new initiative.
Part II of this Article will discuss how heuristics and biases impact
human behavior and decision-making, focusing in particular on how
an understanding of these mental shortcuts can lead to improved
regulatory schemes designed to gain compliance from affected
actors. Part III expands on Part II by explaining the problems with
the "rational polluter" model in light of what we know about
heuristics and biases and will use polarization and devaluation to
explain some of the current problems with resistance on the part of
3. See generally U.S. EPA, Nat'l Water Quality Inventory: 1994
Rep to Congress ES-13 (1995).
4. See U.S. EPA, Latest Findings on Nat'l Air Quality: 1999
Status and Trends 2 (Aug. 2000).
5. Dean S. Sommer, Cooperative Approaches: Public
Pollution/Public Resolution, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 33
(Aug. 1995).
[VOL. XVI
2005] BEHAVIORAL CRITIQUE OF COMMAND-AND-CONTROL 225
industry in complying with the regulations of the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"). Part IV will explain why, in light of the
status quo bias and the endowment effect, a cap and trade system is
not the answer.
Finally, Part V will hold up the innovative Project XL as a
potential flexible solution in which industry and the EPA work
together to lower emissions and find creative ways to minimize the
output of pollutants at facilities. The Conclusion calls for an
increase in the amount of attention paid to human heuristics and
biases in the development of regulatory schemes. Only in
accounting for these powerful factors that drive human behavior will
we begin to achieve success in gaining a high level of compliance.
II. THE EFFECTS OF HEURISTICS AND BIASES IN REGULATORY
SCHEMES
Traditional law and economics is based upon the premise that legal
rules are best viewed through an economic lens. This position
involves the notion that human beings strive to achieve an optimal
state, working with a stable set of preferences and accumulating the
optimal amount of information in a variety of different situations. 6
The economic view thereby relies upon the "rational actor" model of
human behavior, which holds that human beings act in logical ways
to maximize their expected utility.7
6. For a detailed explanation of a law and economics approach,
see GARY. S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 14 (Chicago 1976).
7. According to David Spence, "the civil enforcement provisions
of the major pollution control statutes follow the rational polluter
model of enforcement by assuming that prospective violators of
environmental laws make compliance decisions using an expected
value calculation, as follows:
E(NC) = [S-pF]
where E(NC) = the expected value of noncompliance,
S = the economic benefit (or savings) associated with
noncompliance, such as the money saved by taking fewer
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This approach to the study of law has been challenged by social
scientists who argue that human beings do not act in a manner that is
consistent with traditional economic principles.8  According to
psychologists, when human beings are faced with decisions or
complex situations they do not act like perfect logical machines,
processing information flawlessly based upon a stable set of
predetermined preferences. Time and time again, empirical evidence
has demonstrated the inherent flaws in an economic approach to
behavior. 9 Ultimately, the question facing scholars of behavioral
steps to minimize pollution, failing to monitor, or failing to
report as required by law,
pF = the expected costs of noncompliance, since
p = the probability that a violation will be detected, and
F = the expected penalty (or fine) imposed if detected.
If the expected value of noncompliance is negative, we expect
the rational polluter to comply with the law; if it is positive, we
expect the rational polluter to violate the law." David Spence, The
Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational
Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 920
(2001).
8. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000).
9. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds., 1982 [hereinafter
Tversky & Kahneman]; see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky];
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 8; Neil D. Weinstein,
Unrealistic Optimist About Future Life Events, 39. J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980); Baruch Frischhoff, Hindsight
Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPER. PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 288 (1975); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 1325, 1327 (1990).
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law and economics is "[h]ow do 'real people' differ from homo
economicus?"l0
The answer to this question originally came from Herbert Simon,
who advanced the notion of bounded rationality, and Amos Tversky
and Daniel Kahneman, who formulated prospect theory. Bounded
rationality reflects the notion that there are inherent limitations to a
human beings' ability to reason logically." Notably, people have
limited ability to reason and have seriously flawed memory. 12 As a
result, particularly when access to information is limited or a
situation is uncertain, we take mental shortcuts. Prospect theory
incorporates information about how these shortcuts affect behavior
and decision-making in predictable ways.'
3
As a result of the groundbreaking work of Tversky, Kahneman and
others, 14 the current understanding of human information processing
and decision-making is informed by a model of human judgment and
choice that emphasizes efficiency. Behavioral theorists now
emphasize the role that heuristics, or shortcuts, play in how
individuals determine a course of action. 15 For the most part, these
heuristics are automatic and unconscious. They are helpful in that
they limit the amount of information processing required. These
shortcuts, however, can lead to systematic errors or unhelpful biases.
Errors and biases are particularly likely to occur when the situation
being evaluated is not well suited to the use of the heuristic, or
alternatively, when there is over-reliance on a heuristic. 16
A good heuristic for purposes of illustration is the optimism bias.
The optimism bias is best described as inflated self-confidence.
Research has demonstrated that people are much more likely to think
that good things will happen to them than conventional wisdom (and
10. See Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 9.
11. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational
Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
12. Id.
13. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 9.
14. See id.
15. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124
(1974).
16. Id.
228 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
statistics) would suggest. 17  For instance, when asked, college
students are six times more likely to think that they will have above
average job satisfaction than below average. 18 They are also six
times more likely to think that they will own their own homes than
that they will rent and more than nine times more likely to think they
will never get divorced than believe that their future marriage will
fail. '9
Normally, an optimistic outlook is useful.2 0 Empirically, optimism
and happiness are positively correlated. In addition to happiness,
optimism also tends to accompany success and health.2 ' Depressed
individuals tend to have a far more realistic (and pessimistic) outlook
on life than individuals who are not depressed.2 2 Over-optimism,
however, can also have serious negative repercussions. One
example is the situation in which corporate executives mislead
stockholders by withholding information about the true financial
status of the company. Donald Langevoort attributes this situation to
the optimism bias, arguing that an entire corporate culture of
positivity can spring up, obscuring the harsh reality of a company in
trouble.2
3
For more than a decade, cognitive scientists have been urging
lawyers and policy makers to account for cognitive patterns in legal
17. See generally Weinstein, supra note 9.
18. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism Biases about
Personal Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71, 149
(1998).
19. Id.
20. See W. N. Dember & J. Brooks, A New Instrument for
Measuring Optimism and Pessimism: Test-Retest Reliability and
Relations with Happiness and Religious Commitment, 27 BULL. OF
THE PSYCHONOMIC Soc'y 365 (1989). See also M.E. P. SELIGMAN,
LEARNED OPTIMISM (Knopf 1990).
21. Id.
22. See Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathan D. Brown, Illusion and
Well-being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health,
103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193 (1988).
23. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral
Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and
Cause Other Social Harms), in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS,
supra note 8, at 144, 146-147.
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practice and theory.24 The reason is clear; law is a field that focuses
on controlling human behavior by forcing individuals to internalize
externalities. In order to design efficient and effective laws, policy
makers would be helped by an understanding of how legislation is
likely to influence human behavior.
In some areas of law, cognitive psychology has been influential.
Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar have received acclaim for their
theory of how human behavior is influenced by certain business
practices. Hanson and Lysar argue that the pattern of errors and
biases typical of human reasoning provide fertile ground for market
manipulation. 25  The authors justify their "pessimistic, even
condescending, view of consumers" by citing Campbell's Soup's
practice of stacking cans out of alphabetical order on store shelves, a
practice that increases sales by six percent.26  Besides product
liability law, the behavioral approach has been employed in the area
of juror decision-making, 27 negotiating and mediation, 28 tax, 29 and a
handful of other specialties. 30 In spite of the recent growing trend of
cognitive psychology in law, however, discussion of environmental
law has almost entirely ignored the effects of such biases.
In addition to the recent infusion of the behavioral approach into
normative approaches to lawmaking, there is some evidence that the
24. See Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Symposium:
Legal Implications of Human Error; Cognitive Imperfections:
Consumer Law Preferences, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1986).
25. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
630, 634 (1999).
26. Id. at 747.
27. See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence
and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411,
426-29 (1992). See also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence
Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 242, 251 (1986).
28. See Linda Babcock, et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in
Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995).
29. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 398.
30. See Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal
Risks, 246 SCIENCE 1232, 1232 (1989). See also Ziva Kunda, The
Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480
(1990).
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evolution of certain laws may actually illustrate the incorporation of
behavioral theories. Tax is one area in which an implicit
understanding of cognitive mechanisms seems to have shaped the
evolution of laws. Edward McCaffrey argues that cognitive biases
account for much of how the tax scheme evolved, through input and
opposition, into the modem-day tax code.3 1 Heuristics, he posits, are
therefore responsible for much of the structure of the current tax
system in the United States. He breaks the evolution into two
processes; one in which tax laws that did not accommodate cognitive
biases were phased out, and the other in which tax authorities
actively exploited the cognitive tendencies of the populace.32 The
result is a system that hides some taxes, and minimizes others.
Although critics of the system might point out that McCaffrey's
analysis suggests that the tax code is exploitative, there is no
debating that employing psychological principles results in less
discord, fewer objections, and arguably, more compliance. The idea
is that if the government has to enforce a necessary evil, it makes
sense to cushion the blow.
Like tax law, environmental law may be particularly well suited
for input from cognitive theory. First, the nature of environmental
law, the complexity and the sheer number of regulations, lends itself
to processing shortcuts. Second, this area of law may be particularly
conducive to exploiting cognitive tendencies because, like tax law,
environmental laws impose costs on individuals and corporations.
These costs can either be obvious, and psychologically painful, or
they can be camouflaged, making the bitter pill a little easier to
swallow.
By the same token, if cognitive biases are not taken into account in
the design of environmental laws, legislatures and agencies may be
frustrating the very goals they set out to achieve. This scenario
appears to describe the current situation. Because environmental law
is a twentieth century phenomenon, it has not had the time to evolve
in the same way tax law has. The result is a structure that fails to
capitalize on what we know about human cognitive heuristics. A
structure that does not account for cognitive biases will inevitably
contain miscalculations about human behavior and therefore must,
by definition, be flawed. As Rachlinski and Farina put it, "[t]he
model of government based on cognitive psychology proposes that
31. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 399.
32. Id.
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bad public policy occurs when decision-making structures and
protocols fail to counteract human cognitive limitations. 33
III. APPLYING PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL FINDINGS TO
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. The Rational Polluter Model
The environmental regulation and enforcement scheme was
designed with the rational polluter model in mind. The "rational
polluter" is based upon the generic "rational actor" model followed
by economists. This model assumes that the corporate polluter34 is
an actor who consistently behaves in a manner that best serves his
own interests. Fundamental to the model is the notion that the
polluter understands what is at stake and clearly and accurately
evaluates courses of action, choosing only those that maximize his
gains. Enforcement provisions have been designed with this model
in mind, building a regulatory scheme on the assumption that the
polluter's compliance decisions will follow from the calculation:
E(NC) = [S-pF] where
E(NC) is the expected value of compliance
S is the economic benefit associated with noncompliance
p is the probability that a violation will be detected, and
F is the expected penalty resulting from detection.
35
This model does not include assumptions of irrationality or
cognitive mistakes. It presumes that if the government sets up
33. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia Farina, Cognitive Psychology
and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 580
(2002).
34. For the purposes of this paper, the target of environmental
regulation will be referred to as "the corporate actor" or the
"corporate polluter" or simply "industry." Obviously there are many
other sources of pollution that are significant and worthy of
discussion, such as small business, agriculture, and independent
sources. For the sake of simplicity, this discussion will refer only to
corporate polluters. This is not to suggest that the same principles
do not apply to other types of polluters.
35. See Spence, supra note 7, at 920.
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stringent penalties and maintains adequate enforcement, it will be
successful in gaining compliance. Because the structure of
environmental rules and penalties is designed on this model, if this
model is not an accurate representation of the true decision process
of the polluter, then the system may not be effective in
accomplishing the specified goals.
Behaviorists have had to compete with economists for attention in
the legal arena. Psychology, which attempts to account for as many
factors as possible in order to arrive at a model that has predictive
validity, has received far less attention from legal scholars than has
economics. 36 As Donald Langevoort has noted, "both psychology
and sociology have suffered from the inability to generate a unified
behavioral model rivaling the simplicity, elegance, and testability of
the economist's utility-maximizing rational actor." 37  Although
economic theory has a certain gracefulness, a theory is only as good
as its practical application. Cass Sunstein has remarked, "[i]f human
beings use identifiable heuristics, and if they make systematic errors,
we might better understand why law is as it is, and we might better
generate strategies for ensuring that the law actually promotes social
goals. 3
8
B. The Adversarial Nature of Environmental Law
Because the current system does not capitalize upon the
information psychologists have about cognitive biases, the scheme
created by current environmental laws, far from securing perfect
compliance, actually makes cooperation on the part of big-business
polluters less likely. Two psychological phenomena are relevant to
this argument. The first is polarization, the tendency of like-minded
individuals to become more extreme in their views as a result of
discussing these views. 39 The second is called devaluation, and
occurs when one party undervalues a plan proposed by another
36. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1500 (1998).
37. Id.
38. Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW
& ECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 752.
39. See ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 355-357
(2d ed. 1983).
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party, simply because the two parties are on opposite sides of a
figurative (or literal) bargaining table.40 Together, these biases have
the effect of undermining any potential for goodwill on the part of
potential polluters toward environmental objectives. Since the
government cannot continuously monitor every facility, creating a
situation that encourages cooperation is critical. Ironically, the very
rationale behind the current system-the desire to discourage efforts
to manipulate environmental laws-leads to a policy scheme that
results in just the opposite.
C. Group Polarization
Many decisions in our society are made through a process
involving group deliberation. One of the most well known examples
of this is the jury system, but there are many others, such as lobbying
groups, legislative bodies, school boards, as well as groups within
religious organizations, the judiciary, and corporate America. The
popular notion is that group decision-making leads to better
outcomes. Empirically, however, this assumption appears to be
incorrect in some cases. If a "better" outcome is defined as one that
is more reasoned and deliberate, representing a compromise of
different views, and resulting in a relatively moderate outcome, then
research on group deliberation calls into question the common
practice of using groups in decision-making. Research findings have
suggested that groups tend to be more extreme in their views
following group discussion.41 When members of the group think
similarly at the outset, this polarization is especially likely to occur.
4 2
It appears that members of a group tend to show a preference for
expressing views that confirm one another's beliefs. This tendency
is explained by a social comparison theory, which suggests that
40. See generally Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation
and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION ( K.
Arrow et al., eds., 1995).
41. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization (Dec. 7,
1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
Chicago Law and Economics Working Papers). See also D.G.
Myers & G.D. Bishop, The Enhancement of Dominant Attitudes in
Group Discussion, 20 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 286
(1976).
42. Id.
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people want to be viewed favorably by others, and will therefore
publicly (and privately) adjust their views toward the group
consensus.43 A related explanation is that when individuals meet to
deliberate, their views are confirmed by similarly-minded group
members. Hearing information that confirms previously held views
leads individuals in the group to hold those views even more
strongly than they did prior to the discussion. 44
1. The Effects of Group Polarization on Environmental
Regulation
Some have argued that failures to obey EPA mandates are the
result of the current system being too complicated to offer businesses
a realistic opportunity to comply.45  Another explanation for
noncompliance, however, is related to the group polarization
phenomenon. The current command-and-control method of
regulation may have the effect of polarizing groups, exaggerating
extreme positions on either side of the issue. This polarization is a
result of the type of controls and enforcement mechanisms that
comprise the system.
The problem started with the initial philosophy behind
environmental control. In an effort to curb the phenomenon referred
to as the "tragedy of the commons," 46 an elaborate system was
developed establishing maximum ambient air pollution and water
pollution levels and imposing controls to regulate output of
pollutants accordingly. The CAA requires the EPA to establish
maximum concentrations of pollution, above which adverse health
effects may occur.4 7 The CWA likewise requires the EPA to
43. See JOHN TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP
142 (1987).
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Spence, supra note 7, at 919.
46. The tragedy of the commons is the situation in which a
common resource (such as air, water, or land) is exhausted due to
overuse. The root of the problem of the tragedy of the commons is
the failure of the parties using the common resource to internalize
costs associated with its use. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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establish effluent limits to prevent significant deterioration and
improvement of water quality.4 8 Performance standards, such as
those just described, are the most common way of managing and
regulating pollutants. Most of the limitations set by the EPA are
technology based, but do not specify technology. Overall, the
current command-and-control system emphasizes a ceiling for
pollutants, uniformity in how regulations are applied, and little
flexibility from facility to facility.
Justifications for a command-and-control system of regulation tend
to focus on ease of administration. 49  It is often difficult or
impossible to determine the source of pollutants. The large number
of regulatory targets makes monitoring difficult. 50 Requiring that
point sources be regulated in accordance with a national standard of
water quality, for example, allows the government to avoid the
difficulties involved with proving the source of harm. In addition,
requiring one standard regardless of geographic location avoids the
problem of the "race to the bottom" that could arise if states lowered
pollution standards in order to attract industry to the area.
5 1
In order to enforce the limits the system puts on output of toxins
for each type and source, there are severe penalties, typically
$25,000 per violation per day. 52 In addition to civil penalties, there
are also criminal penalties for violations. Criminal sanctions include
fines ranging from $25,000 to over a million dollars, and jail time
ranging from one to fifteen years.53 The effort to investigate and
pursue environmental criminal prosecutions, which are handled by
48. 33 U.S.C. § 13 11(b) (1988).
49. See Thomas McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-
Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental
Regulation, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 203-11 (1983).
50. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 985 (3d ed. 2000).
51. See PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 143 (1994).
52. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1319(d) (Supp. 2000); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(g) (Supp. 2000); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (Supp. 2000).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (Supp. 2000).
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the Department of Justice, has increased dramatically since the
inception of the Pollution Prosecution Act in 1990.
54
Fear on the part of the legislature and the public that well-funded
corporations might band together and "capture" the policy-making
process led legislators to include citizen suits and public disclosure
provisions as part of the scheme. 55 Private enforcement actions
supplement agency enforcement, which is under-utilized because of
budget considerations. 56 Paying for enforcement becomes a concern
when Congress passes legislation but does not appropriate sufficient
funds to regulate and enforce these statutes. 57 Citizen suits fill the
58gap agencies leave. Citizen enforcement is a feature in all the
major federal environmental statutes.59 Because part of the system
of enforcement relies upon citizen suits, environmental groups have
54. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 50, at 1010 (stating that the
Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990 quadrupled the number of federal
agents who investigate environmental crimes).
55. Spence, supra note 7, at 927. See also ALFRED MARCUS, THE
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
(1982).
56. S. Rep. No. 103-257, at 79 (1994) ("Citizens enforce against
violations that otherwise might not be addressed due to the resource
limitations of State and Federal authorities ...."); Bruce J. Terris,
Private Watchdogs: Internal Auditing and External Enforcement -
Three Perspectives, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10254, 10255 (1987); see
also H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, at 47 (1974) ("The possibility of a
citizen suit provides a strong additional incentive to suppliers to
maintain compliance with the standards.") (statement of Rep.
Staggers).
57. See JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A
STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 62 (1970). See also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 38 (1975) (explaining that agencies also can use
their monopoly of enforcement to nullify a particular statute by
declining to enforce the statute, regulation, or permit).
58. S. Rep. No. 103-331, at 3 (1994) ("Private citizens, acting as
'private attorneys general' can provide a powerful and effective
supplement to the enforcement capabilities of these agencies.").
59. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1995) (citizen
suit provision); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1995).
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shouldered much of the watchdog responsibility. 60 The system of
imposing strict, across-the-board regulations on companies and
soliciting help from citizen groups in policing these companies has
had the effect of publicizing an image of industry actors as "amoral
profit-seekers, whose profit-maximizing behavior can and must be
shaped through incentives. ' 61 In fact, some argue that because of the
burden placed on these citizen groups, the current command-and-
control system has conveyed a social meaning: "citizens" are distinct
from "polluters," and while "polluters" are the problem, "citizens"
are part of the solution.
62
The system of citizen enforcement has had the effect of
stigmatizing industries that are involved in processes that result in a
particularly heavy output of pollutants. 63 Considering the effects of
heavy industry on the living conditions in surrounding areas, it is
easy to be sympathetic to local concerns. One commentator has
noted:
Fighting to keep one's neighborhood free from excessive
environmental hazards that result from waste incinerators is
certainly an uphill battle. Through a combination of
administrative complaints, civil rights lawsuits, and
grassroots organizing, however, a low-income community
can effectively force these corporations out.64
While requiring companies to answer to the public may be a good
strategy for gaining compliance in some respects, the psychological
fallout could be problematic. Corporate decision-makers are less
likely to try to work with environmental groups to reach agreements
if they harbor resentment toward these groups. This situation is
exacerbated by the effect of the uniformity of the rules, which leave
60. See Spence, supra note 7, at 928.
61. Id. at 929.
62. See Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 192-193. It certainly can
be argued that there is truth in some of the stereotypes of corporate
polluters. However, encouraging a culture that provokes industry by
vilifying it is unlikely to be the most productive way in which to
gain compliance.
63. See Spence, supra note 7.
64. See Gregory H. Meyers, Developing a Cohesive Front Against
Environmental "Injustice ", 8 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 27, 27 (2000).
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facilities with little flexibility in how they manage outputs. With
few other options left to them, those in control of corporations work
hard to exert political pressure on legislative bodies. Environmental
groups, in turn, justifiably concerned about corporate "capture,"
lobby hard against reform that might make it easier for polluters to
find loopholes in the system. In the end, the current regulation
system leaves an enormous chasm between environmental and
citizen groups on the one hand, and corporate polluters on the other.
In perpetuating a system that leads naturally to a sharp division
between environmental and corporate interests, drafters of the
environmental legislation have created the perfect situation for
industry to form a collective. Corporate entities circle the wagons
not only for psychological comfort, but also for strategic reasons. It
is in the best interest of each side of the issue to team up with others
who share their interests in an effort to garner enough power to exert
influence over the system. Hence, corporate interests commonly
band together, strategizing, and sharing resources toward the
common goal of effecting environmental policy in ways that are
beneficial for industry.65 As like-minded individuals communicate
around the issue of environmental regulation, they become more
extreme in their views. 66 Hence, the group polarization bias predicts
that communication amongst one another will grow opposition to
environmental rules and regulations. When owners and managers of
regulated companies meet to discuss their common interests, they are
likely to commiserate about the cost of complying with regulations,
agreeing and bolstering one another's opinions until resentment and
disagreement with the EPA's rules has reached a fevered pitch.
Hostility on the part of corporate actors is a problem for several
reasons. First, the chance that any given violation will be detected is
low-particularly when facility managers are antagonistic toward
regulators. Making a determination as to whether a particular plant's
emissions are in compliance requires gaining admission to the plant,
which generally requires notifying the plant operators. 67 If plant
operators are given notice of an inspection, it obviously affords them
65. See Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a
Theory, 46 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 376, 381 (1952).
66. See BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 286.
67. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 50, at 986; see also Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (requiring the EPA to obtain
a warrant before inspecting a business without the owner's consent).
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the opportunity to hide any violations.68 Furthermore, measuring
emissions is problematic. As one commentator points out, "[e]ven
when the source is trying to comply with the permit terms it will
have fluctuating discharges ... the stream being measured is not
constant, and measurements at one time can be applied only to
broader compliance questions through statistical inference."
69
Furthermore, when a violation is detected, the cost of prosecuting
offenders is usually prohibitively high. Judicial enforcement is so
costly that only the most egregious offenses are pursued in court. As
a former assistant attorney general has noted, "[t]he simple truth is
that we cannot bring... even a significant number of these actions to
court." 70 The low detection rate and high cost of prosecuting mean
that without some substantial level of cooperation on the part of
potential polluters, a significant number of violations go unchecked.
The EPA's practice of requiring facilities to self-monitor, critical
because of the EPA's limited resources, is perhaps the most obvious
area where cooperation is necessary.7' Under the CWA, managers
of plants that discharge pollutants into the water are required to file
discharge monitoring reports ("DMRs"), which are available to the
72public. The original CAA required prosecutors to show that a given
source has discharged more pollutants than the applicable state
implementation plan ("SIP"), which was very difficult to prove. In
1990, amendments were added to the CAA to require self-
monitoring. Specifically, utilities subject to Title IV of the CAA
must install continuous emissions monitoring systems.73 Although
the EPA is able to oversee self-monitoring, there is still room for a
discrepancy between what should be reported, and what is
reported.74 A party, which does not take an extreme position against
regulation, is more likely to voluntarily report a violation.
68. Id.
69. See C. RUSSELL ET AL., ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL
LAWS 10 (1986).
70. See Carol E. Dinkins, Shall We Fight or Will We Finish:
Environmental Dispute Resolution in a Litigious Society, 14 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10398 (1984).
71. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 50, at 987.
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a)(A).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7651(k)(a).
74. Id.
240 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Likewise, the owner or operator of a plant who is vehemently anti-
regulation is more likely to resist regulation efforts across the board.
In addition to failing to report, there are numerous other ways in
which a facility can resist regulation efforts. One area where such
resistance might have negative consequences is with respect to
prevention of significant deterioration ("PSD") permits. Normally,
when plant operators modify a facility, a PSD permit is required. A
provision in the CAA, however, specifies that regular maintenance
of existing sources does not require a PSD permit. Interestingly,
very few PSD permits are requested. The reason for this may be that
modifications and new sources are often added to existing facilities
under the guise of regular maintenance. This type of evasive tactic
may be perpetuated in large part because sharp polarization between
environmentalists and the public on the one hand and potential
polluters on the other has stymied any spirit of cooperation that
might have been fostered among plant owners and operators. One
commentator has described the problem this way:
If... the response to noncompliance is inflexible, sanction-
oriented enforcement, regulated entities will become
resentful and hostile. They will feel as though they have
been treated unfairly and that their efforts to comply have
gone unrecognized and unrewarded by regulators. The result
will be resistance: Corporations will be less forthcoming with
information, more apt to exploit regulatory loopholes, more
likely to contest agency conclusions, and more likely to
expend resources litigating citations. In short, they will
become less cooperative.
2. The Availability Heuristic: Its Effect on Polarization
Although it is easy to focus on industry as the critical locus of
control, the reaction of the public is an important factor because as
public opinion turns against industry, industry is increasingly likely
to react with hostility and resentment. A common corollary of a
75. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the
Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
1181, 1204 (1998) (It should be noted that while Rechtschaffen
describes this argument in his paper, he disagrees with this line of
reasoning and is in favor of a strict deterrence approach.).
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surge in public outrage over corporate polluters is an increase in
regulation, since the American populace can exert an enormous
amount of pressure on elected officials and other policy makers.76
Hence, as the public becomes increasingly indignant about
industry's impact on the environment, two outcomes are likely. The
first is that the public will increasingly disparage industry and the
second is that regulation is likely to become tighter and penalties
more severe. 77 If these trends increased compliance with EPA
standards, it would be one thing. As this paper has attempted to
demonstrate, however, such a result is likely to increase polarization
and foster deliberate noncompliance on the part of industry leaders.78
Because of the potential backlash that might occur after an
outpouring of public concern, it is important to be mindful of how
availability cascades can impact the attitude of businesses that are
subject to regulation. The availability heuristic states that how likely
individuals are to fear a given negative event is directly related to
how readily that event can be brought to mind.79  Availability
cascades can be defined as "social cascades, or simply cascades,
through which expressed perceptions trigger chains of individual
responses that make these perceptions appear increasingly plausible
through their rising availability in public discourse. ' 8° Collective
availability errors occur when the availability heuristic occurs
repeatedly in the context of certain set of social factors. 81 Generally,
availability cascades occur when a particularly salient event receives
widespread media coverage. Cascades can also occur when
information travels by word of mouth. Often collective availability
errors occur through a combination of media and word of mouth
information dissemination. The "error" is generally in the perceived
danger of a particular negative consequence occurring.
76. An example is the spawning of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response and Liability Act (CERCLA), following
widespread publicity and public outrage over the Love Canal. See
Tim Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Controlling Availability Cascades,
in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 374, 376-78.
77. See id. at 376-80.
78. See supra notes 39-66 and accompanying text.
79. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 9, at 3.
80. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 76, at 374.
81. Id.
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One well-known example of an availability cascade shaping public
opinion about environmental hazard is the case of Love Canal. In
the 1940s and 50s, a chemical company filled an empty waterway
with chemical waste. 82 Several years later, after the area had been
developed into a residential neighborhood and a school, the New
York Department of Environmental Conservation traced
contaminated fish in Lake Ontario back to the site. Widespread
panic ensued. Pressure on local government led the New York State
Health Commissioner to declare a public health emergency.
Pregnant women and children under the age of two were removed
from the area. Eventually President Carter relocated local families at
a cost of several million dollars. A later study by the EPA failed to
find significant contamination at the site of Love Canal.
Nevertheless, in 1987, the EPA conducted a study revealing that
Americans now rank hazardous waste sites as the greatest
environmental risk, above acid rain, ground water pollution, and
ozone depletion, among others. 83  The Love Canal incident
illustrates the power of availability cascades to shape the thinking of
large numbers of people.
While the Love Canal is an example of an event that was blown
out of proportion, sometimes perfectly horrific events also give rise
to the availability heuristic. An example is a plane crash. In the
instance of a plane crash, the difficulty is not that people exaggerate
the seriousness of the original event, but rather that the original event
is so salient that it stays with those who hear of it for a long time.
Because an event like a plane crash is easily brought to mind, people
overestimate the frequency of plane crashes. 84 Like plane crashes,
certain very disturbing environmental catastrophes may loom large
in the minds of many, who in turn overestimate the frequency of
these types of environmental calamities. Furthermore, if it is easy to
think of an instance of corporate greed or irresponsibility leading to
the contamination of a neighborhood or the death of wildlife,
82. See id. (for an expanded account of how the events
surrounding the Love Canal scare were influenced by the availability
heuristic). See also Lois MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: MY STORY
(1982).
83. See id. at 9.
84. For more on this phenomenon, see Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 9.
[VOL. XVI
2005] BEHAVIORAL CRITIQUE OF COMMAND-AND-CONTROL 243
individuals may assume that this type of irresponsibility is a
common trait of similar corporations.
The Exxon Valdez oil spill is one of the most famous
environmental disasters. On March 24, 1989 at 12:04 a.m., the
Exxon Valdez oil tanker struck a reef in Alaska's Prince William
Sound. A total of 11,000,000 gallons of oil was spilled.85 Within
two months the oil had been swept along a 470-mile pathway to the
southwest. Initial clean-up of the spill took three years at a cost
amounting to billions of dollars. 86  The effect on wildlife was
enormous, with the death toll of wildlife amounting to millions. 87 In
large part because of media coverage following these terrible events,
millions of people were shocked by the news when it first occurred
and, over time, became familiar with the details. Unlike Love Canal,
there is no question that the Exxon Valdez was a tragedy. Like Love
Canal, however, Exxon Valdez and other large-scale environmental
disasters pose problems for those who work for and with large
corporations on pollution control. Because Exxon Valdez has
become an easily retrievable instance of a large corporation causing
a massive amount of damage to the environment, it is likely to have
the same impact on views about corporate polluters as a highly
publicized plane crash is to have on people's perceptions about the
danger of air travel.
When an event occurs that causes the public to overestimate the
likelihood that corporations will cause harm to the environment, it
has the effect of galvanizing environmental interests and creating
increased distrust of industry among members of the public. In a
situation where polarization is already driving opposing interests
85. See Green Chemistry, at http://www.chemsoc.org/
exemplarchem/entries/2004/bristol vickery/famousenvironmental_
disasters.htm (last visited Jun 19, 2005); see also EXPLORENORTH,
THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL DISASTER at
http://www.explorenorth.com/library/weekly/ aa032499.htm (last
visited Jun 19, 2005); VROM SHARED SPACES at http://www2.
vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=5969 (last visited Jun 19, 2005).
86. EXPLORENORTH, THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL DISASTER at
http://www.explorenorth.com/library/weekly/aa032499.htm (last
visited Jun. 19, 2005.
87. Id.
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88further apart, this widespread inflated suspicion can add fuel to the
89fire. Public outrage, particularly if it is misplaced, can exacerbate
antagonism between industry leaders and watchdog groups who see
to it that the public is informed. 9° Hence, the availability bias may




Because the current system pits corporate interests against
environmental interests in such an overt way, there is also a risk that
any negotiating between businesses and environmental interests will
be affected by reactive devaluation. 92 Reactive devaluation occurs
when parties on one side of a dispute or negotiation automatically
undervalue proposals from an opposing party in a negotiation,
simply because the source of the proposal is an adversary. 93 For
instance, in one study, when participants were asked to evaluate a
nuclear disarmament proposal they supported it 90 percent of the
time if they were told that the author was President Reagan, but only
44 percent of the time if they were told that it was authored by a
Soviet leader.94 The normative explanation for this reaction is the
presumption on the part of the evaluators of a proposal that the
proposal must be relatively more beneficial to the other side.
Otherwise, why would they offer it? 95 In addition, the evaluators
might assume an imbalance in information that favors the
88. See supra notes 39-66 and accompanying text for a more in-
depth analysis of the polarization phenomenon.
89. Public outrage is only misplaced if, because of the availability
heuristic, the memory of one or two irresponsible acts causes the
public to wrongly (or prematurely) condemn a whole industry.
90. See Spence, supra note 7, at 928.
91. Id. at 929.
92. See Lee Ross and C. Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict
Resolution, 8 NEG. J. 389 (1991).
93. Id.
94. C. Stillinger et al., The Reactive Devaluation Barrier to
Conflict Resolution, (unpublished manuscript on file with Stanford
University).
95. See generally Ross, supra note 40.
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opposition.96 The automatic triggering of these suspicions would
naturally lead to a greater likelihood that the proposal would be
rejected.
1. The Problem of Devaluation and Environmental Regulation
Although industry's role in the development of environmental laws
is not equivalent to that of a party in a standard business negotiation,
corporate interests do have lobbying power and influence with
respect to environmental legislation. It is this very power that
created the fear that industry would capture the environmental
regulatory process in the first place. 98 Evidence for this power is
manifest in some of the concessions that have been made to
corporate interests in environmental legislation. Examples include
the grandfather clause in the CAA, 99 the RCRA mandate not to
interfere with production or closed-loop recycling,' °° the CERCLA
innocent purchaser clause,'01 and more. If industry views these
concessions with suspicion or hostility, or even if industry leaders
simply undervalue them, any efforts by the legislature or the EPA to
compromise in order to gain goodwill and compliance from
corporate actors could be undermined.
IV. PROPOSALS INVOLVING MARKET-BASED SCHEMES
A. The Problem with Market-Based Schemes
Many have argued that the solution needed to fix the ailing system
of environmental control is to turn the system into one that is
96. Id.
97. See generally Robert Glicksman and Stephen Chapman,
Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) the Contract with America:
Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying Environmental
Protection? 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9 (1996).
98. See Spence, supra note 7, at 927.
99. The grandfather clause allows facilities that existed prior to
the Clean Air Act to avoid certain permitting requirements.
100. 45 Fed. Reg. 33, 119-20 (1980); 50 Fed. Reg. 614 (Jan. 4,
1985).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
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primarily based on the marketplace. 10 2 The theory behind a market
system is that this type of scheme would shift cost-benefit decisions
from government to businesses. A market-based aproach, so the
argument goes, would provide economic efficiency.
An example of a market-based strategy for regulating pollutants at
work is the "cap and trade" system.' °4 The cap and trade system is
based upon pollution allowances and rights to emit one-ton units of
sulfur-dioxide emissions. These rights were distributed to utilities
across the country. Each polluting source was given an emissions
target. Plant operators who exceeded their pollutant limits were
required to acquire allowances from other sources. Anyone could
hold, buy, or sell allowances, which could be traded as any other
commodity. The EPA was required to track all emission allocations
and collect enough allowances from each regulated facility's account
to cover their emissions from the prior year.'1
0 5
102. See C. Boyden Gray, Obstacles to Regulatory Reform, 1997
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 1 (1997).
103. See Eric Mikkelson, Earning Green for Turning Green:
Executing Order 12,291 and Market-Driven Environmental
Regulation, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 243, 246 (1993).
104. See Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand
Policy Experiment? Lessons from S02 Allowance Trading, 12 J.
ECON. PERSP. 69, at 79 (Summer 1998).
105. The EPA's Clean Air Market Programs is called "allowance
trading" or "cap and trade" and has the following key features:
1. An emissions "cap": a limit on the total amount of
pollution that can be emitted (released) from all regulated
sources (e.g., power plants); the cap is set lower than
historical emissions to cause reductions in emissions
2. Allowances: an allowance is an authorization to emit a
fixed amount of a pollutant
3. Measurement: accurate tracking of all emissions
4. Flexibility: sources can choose how to reduce emissions,
including whether to buy additional allowances from
other sources that reduce emissions
5. Allowance trading: sources can buy or sell allowances on
the open market
6. Compliance: at the end of each compliance period, each
source must own at least as many allowances as its
emissions,
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Schemes like cap and trade, which rely upon market forces might
alleviate some of the problems related to polarization and
devaluation, however, this approach would lead to other problematic
cognitive biases. The difficulty with market-based solutions is that
they inevitably begin with initial allocations. In order for a trading
system to be efficient, allowances must move to their highest value.
Two heuristics, the endowment effect and the status quo bias,
suggest that those who initially receive the allocations will overvalue
them and will be less willing than they should be to trade them.
B. The Endowment Effect
Legal entitlement tends to create an endowment effect."' The
endowment effect is "the increased value of a good to an individual
when the good becomes part of the individual's endowment."'
0 7
Simply put, possessing a right or an object causes the owner to
assign it a higher value than the market would. Typically, the owner
of a good or an entitlement will require more to sell it than he or she
would have paid to obtain it. This effect was demonstrated in a
study in which participants were given money or a mug or were
given the choice between receiving money or a mug. Buyers
valued the mug at $2.87, Choosers at $3.12, and Sellers at $7.12.109
Allowance Trading Basics, available at http://www.epa.gov/
airmarkets/trading/basics/ (last visited May 25, 2005).
In addition to the difficulties associated with a cap and trade
system discussed in this paper, there are other criticisms such as that
presented by Professor David Driesen, who notes that cap-and-trade
strategies can stifle innovation and result in concentrated local
pollution. See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch Or Cheap Fix?: The
Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 71 (1998).
106. See Daniel Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 226-227.
107. Id. at 213. See also Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory
of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) (finding
a discrepancy between selling and buying prices).
108. See Kahneman, et al., supra note 106, at 221-223.
109. Id. (Referring to Experiment 6. Results in Experiment 7 were
similar.)
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In addition to valuing the mug, Sellers and Buyers were asked to
attempt to negotiate with one another for the exchange of the mug.
Presumably because the negotiating parties had very different ideas
about the value of the mug, far fewer trades took place than
expected."10  The notion is that the endowment effect is a
manifestation of loss aversion, the human tendency to weigh a loss
more heavily than a gain.III
The endowment effect has profound importance because it directly
contradicts the Coase Theorem, an influential economic theory about
bargaining. The Coase Theorem states that, in the absence of
transaction costs, initial allocation is irrelevant.' 12 Accordingly,
economic theory would make the prediction that supply and demand
curves would mimic one another, and that, in a market environment,
a good would be as likely to trade hands as it would be to stay in the
same hands. 113 In the context of a cap-and-trade scheme, the
endowment effect predicts that on average, the holder of an
allowance will place a higher price on it than the market will bear.
Ultimately, as was demonstrated in the mug experiment, this
discrepancy will result in fewer emissions trades.
C. The Status Quo Bias
Another human tendency that is closely related to the endowment
effect is the status quo bias. The status quo bias is based upon the
fundamental human desire for consistency, and states that
individuals tend to focus upon a starting point, and evaluate
deviations in terms of that point.'' 5 The result of this bias is that
human beings demonstrate a reluctance to deviate from what they
110. In Experiment 6, 12.5 trades were expected, but only 3 trades
took place. Id. at 223.
111. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 5.
112. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
113. See Kahneman et al., supra note 106, at 211.
114. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 9.
115. See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note
8, at4.
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perceive to be a default status.116 Russell Korobkin notes that the
effect of the status quo bias is that "completely alienable legal
entitlements will be 'sticky'-that is, tend not to be traded--even
when stickiness cannot be explained by transaction costs.' '"17 In
terms of trading allowances, the status quo bias predicts that there
will be a preference for holding on to initial allocations. It further
predicts that because of the tendency to focus on the starting point,
trading away allowances will result in a greater perceived deficit
than would be predicted by traditional economic theory. The result
is that any party who holds a legal entitlement initially will (on
average) demand a higher price and be more reluctant to part with
the entitlement simply by virtue of possessing the right in the first
place.
D. How Endowment and Status Quo Effects Cap and Trade
Schemes
The endowment effect and the status quo bias mean that
companies that hold pollution rights are likely to (a) overvalue them
and (b) be reluctant to part with them. As a result, a market-based
approach may actually lead to an over-all inefficient scheme because
the allocated right will tend to stay with the initial holder longer than
is optimal. The party who receives the right initially may demand a
higher price for the right than the market will bear. This is not to
argue that companies who operate under a cap-and-trade system will
never allocate allowances to the highest bidder. Rather, it suggests
that the price required to move those allowances from one company
to another will be artificially inflated. In addition, because in some
cases companies will be unwilling to pay inflated prices for the
allowance, the maximum number of efficient trades will not occur.
A further consideration is the effect on new companies.
Companies that come along after the initial allocations are made will
have to negotiate with those companies that were fortunate enough
to be around when the allocations were being handed out. Given the
status quo bias and the endowment effect, chances are that the new
companies will pay inflated prices for those polluting rights.
116. See Russel Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract
Formation and Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS,
supra note 8, at 120.
117. Id.
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Contrary to the Coase Theorem, 1 18 which would predict that the
initial allocation of pollution rights is irrelevant because parties will
bargain around them, the endowment effect and the status quo bias
suggest that if new companies have to acquire start-up allowances
from preexisting companies, they will incur greater than expected
costs. 119 In areas where offset requirements exist, a new facility
must obtain allowance sufficient to cover its allowance needs. If
preexisting companies charge a premium for allowances, new
arrivals to industry could be fighting an uphill battle. The result of a
scheme that creates a hostile situation for upstart companies could be
a decrease in competition among some industries-an outcome that
could prove problematic.
V. CONSIDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL FACTORS: SCULPTING A
SOLUTION
A. A Behavioral Solution to Environmental Regulation
Because command-and-control designs and market systems are
subject to inefficient or problematic outcomes due to cognitive
biases, a new approach is needed.
Behavioral research reveals the advantage of cooperative
approaches that seek to gain compliance as an initial matter over
punitive systems that focus only on intervention after the fact.
Lately, the idea of focusing on compliance has gained favor with
state and federal officials. For instance, several years ago, Virginia's
Secretary of Natural Resources told Congress that "the truth is that
enforcement action means "failure" not success .. .Policies which
focus on compliance with environmental laws are better for the
natural resources than policies which focus on enforcement."
120
118. See Coase, supra note 112.
119. The mug experiment demonstrated the inflated valuation of a
good on the part of those who hold the good and suggests that under
such circumstances, the holder of the good is likely to charge a
premium to part with it. See supra notes 106-111 and accompanying
text.
120. The Relationship Between Federal and State Governments in
the Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 190 (1997)
[hereinafter Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and
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Both the federal and state governments have been re-examining
traditional enforcement systems, which focus on deterrence and
punishing violations. 
121
Recognition of problems with the current system has led some to
propose that the punitive system be replaced with one that offers
incentives. It has been noted that "[a]s the limitations of policies
that emphasize command-and-control regulation become more
evident, environmental law is becoming increasingly receptive to
approaches that use economic incentives to affect behavior."'1 22 As
has been demonstrated, a move toward including industry
representatives in the process of crafting regulation is supported by
behavioral research. Revisions of the current regulatory structure
should therefore involve a more cooperative model. This approach
should focus on avoiding conditions that increase suspicion and
hostility between corporate and environmental interests.' 23
General research on polarization has demonstrated a clear
tendency of groups to become increasingly extreme under conditions
such as those created by citizen suits and unilaterally imposed
regulations carrying harsh penalties. More specific research on the
effects of a cooperative versus a punitive regulatory system,
however, has not been studied. Nevertheless, there is some limited
evidence that soliciting cooperation may increase compliance. For
instance, a compliance incentive program implemented with the auto
repair industry in Santa Rosa, California, reported positive results.
In place of traditional enforcement practices, local regulators began
an intensive program of providing information and technical
assistance to businesses. The regulators also awarded recognizable
stickers to cooperating businesses, and attempted to raise consumer
awareness about the program. 124 Prior to the implementation of the
program, the compliance rate hovered near zero. After the
State Governments] (prepared statement of Becky Norton Dunlop,
Secretary of Natural Resources, Commonwealth of Virginia).
121. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 75, at 1183.
122. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 50, at 1236.
123. But see generally Rechtschaffen, supra note 75, at 1183
(arguing that "we should ease the rush to dismantle traditional,
deterrence-based civil enforcement").
124. See John W. Garn et al., The Compliance Incentive
Experience in Santa Rosa, California, in THIRD INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 527, 529 (1994).
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campaign, however, almost 75 percent of the repair shops were fully
compliant after two inspections. 1
25
Critics of a cooperative scheme have pointed out that some
evidence points to the superiority of a strict deterrence approach.
For example, one study comparing the paper industries in the United
States and Canada, found that Canadian companies were
significantly less likely to comply with regulations limiting
effluence. This has been cited as evidence that a cooperative
approach is less effective, because the approach in the United States
is deterrence, whereas the regulatory system in Canada is a
cooperative endeavor. 126 What this argument overlooks, however, is
that the United States and Canada are separate countries with distinct
corporate culture norms.
The nature of environmental regulations, their rigidity and their
one-size-fits-all nature make it particularly likely that industry will
feel trapped and saddled with rules that are costly and facility-
inappropriate. For the good of all parties involved, any new
proposal should maximize flexibility and opportunity for creative
solutions. Most importantly, it should foster open communication
between all parties involved in creating and carrying out pollution
control. A system that stresses these goals serves two main
purposes. First, a structure based upon these objectives would permit
those with corporate interests the opportunity to help shape
environmental regulation. Commentator Lee Ross stresses that in
order to minimize the hostility and suspicion that often leads to
devaluation, input should be solicited from the opposing party.
127
Open communication between corporate and environmental interests
should be fostered in order to minimize the perception of imbalances
in information. These elements are critical to what Ross has called a
"problem solving orientation."'128
Like all reforms, one designed with these goals in mind will have
certain important considerations. First, even fierce advocates for
industry generally acknowledge the necessity of a strong centralized
125. See id. at 544.
126. See Kathryn Harrison, Is Cooperation the Answer? Canadian
Environmental Enforcement in Comparative Context, 14 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 221, 237-38 (1995); see also Rechtschaffen,
supra note 75, at 1210.
127. See Ross, supra, note 40, at 39.
128. Id.
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system of control to oversee cooperative solutions.' 29 Among other
functions, the EPA would have to balance the degree to which
standards were relaxed for particular toxins in order to assure that
individualized plans did not result in higher than optimal levels of
any given pollutant in a geographic area. To this end, air and water
quality standards would still play a central role, and state
cooperation would be needed in monitoring local levels of pollutants
in the air and water. Additionally, although environmental reform
allowing more flexibility and input from industry should foster
increased compliance, the EPA would still need to monitor effluent
outputs, point sources, and toxic waste handlers in order to assure
that infractions were not occurring.1 30 Ideally, the end result would
be custom-built plans designed in a cooperative manner by facilities'
managers and the EPA. Although the EPA and ancillary agencies
would initially be required to devote resources to the approval of
individualized plans, ideally, the new system would ultimately lead
to a decrease in the EPA's watchdog burden because there would be
fewer violations under the new program.
B. A Model Solution: Project XL
In 1995, President Clinton launched a regulatory reform project
entitled Project XL.13 1 The project, whose name stands for
excellence and leadership, was designed to provide more flexibility
to companies, permitting company owners and managers to provide
their own plans for pollution control. 132 In exchange for an overall
decrease in the amount of pollutants released, participants of Project
XL are offered the opportunity to avoid some standard requirements
129. See David Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the
Foundations of Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 145, 167 (1995).
130. Under the new system, an "infraction" would result when a
facility was not maintaining output levels included in the proposed
and approved plan.
131. See Intel Corporation: About Project XL, at
http://www.intel.com/intel/other/ehs/projectxl/AboutXUJAboutXLH
MP.htm, (last visited May 23, 2005); U.S. EPA, First XL Regulatory
Reinvention Project Approved, (History), at http://www.epa.gov/
history/topics/reinvent/06.htm.
132. Id.
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that may be more costly.' 33 For example, each statute focusing on a
particular medium (mode of pollutant) generally requires its own
individual set of regulations. The requirements for separate permits,
different control mechanisms, and distinct reporting and monitoring
drive up the costs of doing business significantly.
One of the primary objectives of Project XL is to streamline
regulation, making the system more efficient and compliance less
onerous.134 According to Gordon Moore, a participant in Project
XL, "[t]he new system envisioned by Project XL is to work
cooperatively and focus on the results: a cleaner environment; a
faster, less costly system; and more input from the local
community."' 135 The primary goals of Project XL are to:
Offer regulatory flexibility in return for better results;
Build stronger partnerships between state and local
governments, community leaders, businesses, and private
citizens;
Facilitate compliance by making regulatory information
easier to understand;
Cut red tape associated with environmental regulation; and
Make it easier to report, obtain, and understand information
about the environment.
136
While Project XL has received some criticism, 137 it has been




135. See U.S. EPA, Common-Sense Strategies to Protect Public
Health: A Progress Report on Reinventing Environmental
Regulation 9; Intel Corporation: About Project XL, at
http://www.intel.com/intel/other/ehs/projectxl/AboutXUAboutXLH
MP.htm, (last visited May 23, 2005).
136. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 50, at 177.
137. See, e.g., Rena Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-
Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998).
138. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: AN
AGENDA FOR CONGRESS, EPA & THE STATES 75 (1997).
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Initially, the EPA decided to implement 50 pilot projects under
Project XL. 139 Members of EPA's Office of Policy, Economics, and
Innovation, who coordinate the program, invited applications from
private businesses, federal operations, and state and local
governments. 140 Projects were selected based upon their potential to:
produce superior environmental results beyond those that
would have been achieved under current and reasonably
anticipated future regulations or policies;
produce benefits such as cost savings, paperwork reduction,
regulatory flexibility or other types of flexibility that serve as
an incentive to project sponsors and regulators;
be supported by stakeholders;
achieve innovation/pollution prevention;
produce lessons or data that are transferable to other
facilities;
demonstrate feasibility;
establish accountability through agreed upon methods of
monitoring, reporting, and evaluations; and
avoid shifting justice problems as a result of the
experiment. 141
In January of 2001, the EPA approved the 50th project proposal,
and the experiment was underway. The EPA has vowed to continue
to fulfill its obligations by monitoring each of the Project XL
projects carefully.' 42
By avoiding situations that foster counterproductive biases, Project
XL increases the chances that businesses will cooperate fully with
139. In January of 2001, the EPA approved the 50th project and the
experiment is currently underway. See U.S. EPA, Project XL:
What's New, available at http://www.epa.gpv/Project
Xllwhatsnew.htm.
140. See U.S. EPA, Project XL: What is Project XL?, available at
http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/file2.htm (last visited May 25, 2005).
The implementation of most Project XL projects requires flexibility
not only from federal, but also state regulations. Accordingly, in
selecting projects, the EPA works with local governments to
determine the suitability of the proposal. See U.S. EPA, Project XL:
Starting an XL Project, available at
http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/file3.htm (last visited May 25, 2005).
141. See id.
142. See Sommer, supra note 5.
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the EPA. Because those being regulated have a hand in determining
how the regulations will by carried out, hostility and polarization are
less likely to occur. As a result of the cooperative effort involved
with Project XL, devaluation of the other side's proposals are apt to
be less frequent, and better solutions are possible. It avoids the
problems of the endowment effect and status quo bias created by the
initial appropriation of allowances under the cap-and-trade system.
Most importantly, it achieves these goals without sacrificing any of
the goals of environmental regulation. 143  Because Project XL
requires companies to cut more pollution than required by law,
ultimately, fewer pollutants are released under the program. In
addition, since participation in the program is voluntary and gives
businesses some measure of control, the chance that violations will
occur decreases.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the United States has made great strides toward protecting
our natural resources, we still have far to go. The EPA presides over
a vast amount of complex regulatory law, and yet, the effectiveness
of environmental regulations is questionable. 144 More than one third
of rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, and estuaries in the United States are
not clean enough for the uses the state has designated for them.
145
More than 20,000 bodies of water have been deemed polluted.
146
143. But see generally, Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental
Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform
Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1 (questioning the legality of Project XL).
144. See Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 193; see also Shapiro,
supra note 2, at 727; Pedersen, supra note 2, at 1059; Peter H.
Lehner, The Need for Continued and Expanded Environmental
Enforcement in New York, 5 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 1 (2000).
145. See U.S. EPA, Office of Water, The Quality of Our Nation's
Water: 1998 (2000) [hereinafter Quality of our Nation's Water].
146. See U.S. EPA, Office of Water, Proposed Regulatory
Revisions to the Total Maximum Daily Load Program and
Associated Proposed Regulatory Revisions to the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System and the Water Quality Standards
Program, available at http://www.epa.gov/owowwtrl/tmdl/tmdlfs.
html.
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The nation's sources of drinking water are no exception, and one
poll disclosed that almost one-half of the population will not drink
their tap water.1 47 More than half of wetlands located in the United
States have been lost. Moreover, the destruction of this type of
fragile ecosystem continues at an alarming rate 148 despite a
commitment to "no net loss" of wetlands. As many as 64,000
people in the United States die from heart and lung diseases that are
aggravated by particulate air pollution, and over 100 million
Americans live in urban centers where the EPA has designated the
air as unsafe to breathe. 149 Sewage and chemical runoff as well as
other forms of pollution have caused authorities to close beaches
more than 60,000 times since 1988.150 It seems clear that "the
current frenzy of environmental degradation is unprecedented."' 1
51
The failure to adequately protect precious environmental resources
in the United States clearly calls for a retooling of strategy. In 1996,
the former manager of the EPA's Superfund enforcement program
asserted that "[i]t has become manifest that the manner in which [the
EPA] imposes, implements, and enforces environmental
requirements is in serious need of reform." 152 This Paper has
argued that, in crafting the needed change, behavioral theory and
research on heuristics and biases is a necessary part of the analysis.
Specifically, consideration of how groups become polarized and the
psychological effects of awarding initial allocations should play a
central role in the structuring of any new system of regulation. As
David Spence argued:
147. See Peter Eisler et al., Lax Oversight Raises Tap Water Risks,
USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 1998, at 15A.
148. See Quality of Our Nations Water, supra note 145, at 29-30.
149. See Natural Resources Defense Council, In Profile 8 (January,
2004).
150. Id. at 10.
151. Michael Soule, What is Conservation Biology, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND BIODIVERSITY 35, 48 (R. Edward
Grumbine ed., 1994).
152. Bruce M. Diamond, Confessions of an Environmental
Enforcer, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,252, 10,252 (May 1996). Diamond
contends that the EPA should shift from its traditional, deterrence-
based, adversarial approach to enforcement to an approach
emphasizing cooperative efforts and greater reliance on industry
self-compliance. See id. at 10,252-56.
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defenders of more collaborative [environmental regulation]
processes make a strong case that they are qualitatively and
democratically superior to traditional processes: bargaining
promotes deliberation, trust, and compromise by bringing
adversaries deeper into the EPA's decision-making
process. 53
Although this paper has argued for a cooperative system of
regulation, I do not, by any means, intend to be advocating increased
leniency for polluters. Clearly, a deterrence component is still
necessary. Some attempts have been made by Congress to
dramatically reduce funding for EPA enforcement activities and
limit the agency's ability to impose penalties. 154 States, which bear
much of the enforcement burden, have in some cases cut funding for
traditional enforcement activities, reduced the frequency of
inspections, and substantially curtailed the penalties assessed for
violations. 155 For example, in 1996 Virginia's General Assembly
determined that the state had repeatedly failed to enforce
environmental protection laws, even in the face of persistent and
egregious violations. The 1996 Virginia State Assembly findings
point out the danger of calling for change in the direction of
cooperation. I do not support a lessening of current standards-far
from it. Rather, I intend to make the argument that in working out a
flexible plan, custom designed for each facility, a cost-effective
progressive plan for pollution control can be implemented. I further
contend that the money saved in failing to implement ineffective,
unnecessary, or inefficient procedures in a given facility can be
channeled towards more effective pollution control in another area,
increasing the overall environmental friendliness of the facility. At
the same time, this creative, cooperative approach will gain the
153. Spence, supra note 7, at 959.
154. See, e.g., Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996, 104 P.L. 121, 223; 110 Stat. 857, 862.
155. See Hearings on the Relationship Between Federal and State
Governments, supra note 121, at 220-23 (prepared statement of
Todd E. Robins, Environmental Enforcement, U.S. Public Interest
Research Group) (documenting reductions in inspections, penalties,
enforcement actions and spending on enforcement staff in numerous
states).
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support of industry players who will be more likely to comply with
agreed upon procedures.
A last word is required about the role of cognitive psychology in
the design and implementation of laws and regulations. A growing
body of research devoted to human behavior and law is casting
doubts on many assumptions fundamental to traditional legal and
economic theory. This is not to suggest that we discard these
theories, but rather that we reevaluate them in light of our growing
understanding of the behavioral tendencies of human beings,
particularly with respect to heuristics and biases. It is
counterproductive to cling to a model of human behavior once it is
discovered that the model lacks predictive validity. If we hope to
design efficient and effective laws and policy, we must strive not for
parsimony, but for accuracy. Until our system takes into account
what we know about cognition, we will not be successful in
achieving our goals with respect to shaping human behavior.

